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Introduction 
At the end of the 1990s online reverse auctions were proposed as a powerful tool to 
improve the performance of corporate procurement. However, as many of the promises of 
the e-Business world failed to materialize the issue received only little attention during 
the last years. Hence, it is not known what kind of role reverse auctions play and what 
kind of auction designs are used in practice. For this reason, the following article tries to 
answer three questions regarding the actual use of auctions in corporate procurement: 1. 
To what extend will reverse auctions replace traditional sourcing negotiations within B2B 
procurement? 2. Which auction forms and auction designs are most appropriate for 
procurement auctions to ensure satisfactory results? 3. What kind of complex auctions 
forms such as combinatorial and multiattribute auctions are successfully applied for B2B 
procurement purposes? 
The results are based on an empirical survey among 113 companies listed at the German 
stock market show that reverse auctions are mainly used by large corporations and only 
to a very limited extend by smaller companies. Interestingly companies mainly use 
different variations of the standard English Auction such as Rank Auctions or Best/Not 
Best Auctions, which have not been studied by auction and game theorists so far. 
Auctions formats recommended by auction theorists such as Hybrid or Dutch Auctions 
are hardly used in practice. Among the more complex auction designs combinatorial 
auctions were not found very often, despite their attractive properties for the procurement 
of goods with potential synergies in production costs. Multiattribute Auctions are used 
much more frequently; however, they are applied for different price attributes rather than 
different quality attributes. 
 
Theoretical Background and Research Hypothesis 
The specific literature on online reverse auctions is mainly management-oriented and not 
based on a thorough analysis of auction theoretical concepts. Often it is influenced by the 
fact that online auctions were still a very new procurement concept in 2001/2002 . In a 
larger study of the CAPS Research institute it is shown that Auctions are successfully 
applied for procurement purposes and that they can achieve substantial price reductions 
(Beall et al. 2003). Furthermore some of the authors show in a following study that 
reverse auctions can be used to purchase complex items and not just simple and 
standardized items (Kaufmann and Carter 2004). However, critics of online reverse 
auctions claim that the savings of auctions are often overvalued (Emiliani and Stec 2002) 
and that suppliers are often very skeptical about fairness in auctions (Jap 2002). 
Summarizing these contributions, the following first research hypothesis is derived: 
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H1. Online reverse auctions will replace supplier negotiations to a certain extent. 
William Vickrey introduced the game theoretical analysis of auctions in his seminal 
paper in 19611. He showed, that in Firstprice and Dutch Auctions, each bidder calculates 
an optimal bid based on his individual valuation, the number of bidders, and the 
distribution of valuations among all bidders (which is assumed to be common 
knowledge). For both auction forms, bidders calculate their optimal bids in the same way, 
thus both auction forms are strategically equivalent. Within English and Secondprice 
Auctions, instead, bidders bid up to their individual valuation. For both auction forms, 
this is their dominant strategy, so both forms are equivalent in revenues as well. The 
major result of Vickrey is that under reasonable assumptions, all four auction formats 
yield the same revenue for the auctioneer. This finding is known as the “Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem, RET” and is one of the most fundamental concepts of auction 
theory. Among other aspects, the research that followed Vickrey work showed which 
auction forms become superior in terms of revenue when certain assumptions are relaxed. 
Firstprice and Dutch Auctions become superior when bidders are risk-averse or when 
there are specific asymmetries in bidders' valuations. The latter is especially important 
when there is one significantly stronger bidder which is expected to outbid all weaker 
bidders (Maskin and Riley 1998). English Auctions are superior to other auction forms 
when bidders' valuations are depended (affiliated) on the valuations of other bidders 
(Milgrom and Weber 1982). If this is the case, only during the English Auction bidders 
receive information about other bidders' valuations to update their personal valuations. 
Based on these results the following research hypotheses are derived:  
H2. Dutch or Firstprice Auctions should be used in the case of risk-averse bidders or in 
 the case of substantial asymmetries between bidders.  
H3. English Auctions should be used if there is dependence between bidders’ valuations 
 (costs in the case of procurement). Thus, especially in very competitive markets, 
 English Auctions should be superior. 
During a first round of preliminary interviews with 19 suppliers of software tools for 
reverse auctions, it showed that different variations of the English Auction played a 
dominant role in the world of procurement auctions. These Variations included Best/ Not 
Best Auctions where only the best bidder is informed that he is currently the best bidder 
(sometimes named Blind Auction); Best Price Auctions where all bidders are informed 
about the current best bid, but nothing else; Pure Rank Auctions where bidders see their 
current rank (1st, 2nd, 3rd, …), but not the actual leading bid; English Rank Auctions 
where the actual leading bid and bidders’ ranks are shown and All Price Auctions where 
all actual bids are shown. To assess the relevance of these variations and potential 
advantages of their application the following research question was introduced:  
H4. Which variations of the English Auction (Best price, Rank, All prices) are applied 
       in practice and to what extent is their application dependent on the specific context? 
                                              
1  Helpful introductions to the basic concepts of auction theory can be found in McAfee and McMillan 1987 and in 
Klemperer 1999. The reader interested in the underlying mathematical and game theoretical models of auction 
theory is referred to Milgrom 2004 and Krishna 2002. 
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During the 1990s, researchers expanded the concept of auctions to more complex 
transactions with more than just the single price being the essential bargaining parameter. 
Combinatorial Auctions were developed for multi-unit auctions with potential synergies 
or complementarities between the units/items to be auctioned. The reasoning is, that with 
existing complementarities optimal bids for each unit depend on whether other units will 
be obtained via the auction or not (Cramton 1998 and 2006). Within Combinatorial 
Auctions bidders can place bids on every possible combination of the items auctioned of 
simultaneously, thus, allowing bidders to bid on an allocation of items, which is optimal 
for them. Multidimensional/Multiattribute Auctions were developed for purchasing 
goods where other parameters than price are relevant as well. They allow suppliers to 
differentiate from their competitors via bidding on other aspects such as qualities, 
delivery time, guarantees, etc. (Che 1993, Branco 1997, Bichler et al. 1999). 
Multiattribute Auctions are often recommended as a useful solution for the procurement 
of more complex goods. So far it has not been assessed, to what extend and under which 
circumstances these complex auctions forms are applied in corporate procurement. Thus, 
the following two final research hypotheses are derived:  
H5. Combinatorial auctions are used frequently, they are promising for purchasing goods 
       with synergies in suppliers’ production costs 
H6. Multiattribute Auctions are used frequently, they are promising for purchasing more 
       complex goods  
 
Empirical Research Approach 
To assess the research hypotheses a series of expert interviews with suppliers of auction-
tools and with auction users from companies was conducted. In a pre-phase19 suppliers 
of auction tools (software and know-how providers) were interviewed to test the 
questionnaire and to identify further research questions. Following this, a survey of 113 
corporations listed in the major German stock market indices (DAX, MDAX, SDAX) 
was carried out to assess the overall use of online reverse auctions and to test the first 
Hypothesis. Finally the other hypotheses were tested during 29 in-depth interviews with 
auction experts from corporations using online reverse auctions. All interviews were held 
on the basis of a standardized questionnaire and all but 4 experts contacted had at least 2 
or more years of experience in the field of online reverse auctions2.  
 
Results of the Empirical Study 
Of the 113 companies contacted during the survey only 100 agreed to participate. Among 
these 100 a total of 35 companies uses reverse auctions for procurement and 65 
companies reported that they don't use reverse auctions. The differentiation of the results 
by stock market indices shows a significant impact of company size on the likelihood of 
using reverse auction. Within the indices for large companies, the DAX, 83% of the 
companies use auctions. Within the indices of mid-size companies, the MDAX only 26% 
                                              
2  For a broader discussion of the empirical approach and underlying methodological aspects see Eichstädt 2007. 
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of the companies use auctions and among the small companies (in the SDAX) only 14% 
use auctions. Having asked for the extend to which reverse auctions are used, 37% of all 
companies reported, that they use auctions only for an insignificantly low amount of total 
spent. 30% stated, that they use auctions for about 5% of their total spent and 33% 
declared that they use auctions for at least 10% of total spent. Summarizing we can state 
that the first Hypothesis is confirmed since about 35% of the companies surveyed use 
auctions, and over 60% of these companies use them for a significant amount (≥5%) of 
their total spent.  
During the expert interviews with auction users it was revealed, that only about 29% of 
all companies use Dutch Auctions. However, all but one of these companies do apply 
them in the case of asymmetries between bidders or in the case of only a small number of 
bidders which is in accordance with theoretical recommendations. All other auction 
forms, however, are only used to a very limited extend, 3 companies (~10%) use Ticker 
or Japanese Auctions, only two companies (~7%) use Firstprice Auctions and just one 
company (~3,5%) uses Hybrid Auctions. Secondprice Auctions are not used at all. Since 
only a limited share of companies uses Dutch Auctions the second hypothesis has to be 
revised. However, at least the few users of Dutch Auctions do know about their 
advantages in the case of bidder asymmetries.   
As mentioned before, the results show, that companies use different variations of the 
English Auction as the main auction format. According to the interviewees the English 
Auction is the preferred auction format since it seems to provide the best results in most 
cases and unlike Dutch Auctions it provides additional information about the bids/prices 
of all participating suppliers. Therefore, the third hypothesis is verified, the English 
Auction is the dominant auction form. The Assumption that sufficient competition among 
bidders is an important driver in these auctions is confirmed by the fact, that there are 
usually 5 and more bidders participating in the auctions.  
Concerning the use of different variations of the English auction, the study provides only 
inconclusive results. 40% of the interviewees reported that they use all different 
variations of the English Auction. However, those using different variations reported 
conflicting motives for the application of the different variations or they stated that the 
choice depends on the preferences of individual buyers. 25% reported that they mainly 
use a Rank Auction without showing the best price, whereas about 15% said they use 
Rank Auctions with best prices. Another 15% claimed to use a classic English Auction 
where all bids can be seen and 5 % reported to use a Best/Not Best Auction as the main 
format. Summarizing this we see that, the results of the survey give little insight into the 
question whether certain variations of the English Auction are superior under certain 
conditions. Thus, the fourth research question can not be answered on behalf of the 
research results. However, we will present an alternative concept of when to use which 
variation of the English Auction in the following chapter. 
Concerning more complex auction forms, only 15% of the companies reported that they 
use Combinatorial Auctions. The few users, however, mentioned that they are superior in 
giving suppliers a chance to make optimal offers dependent on their production costs. 
Those who don’t use Combinatorial Auctions often reported that they want to avoid 
higher technical efforts for the implementation and additional complexity for suppliers. 
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Due to the small amount of companies using combinatorial auctions the fifth hypothesis 
is not confirmed.  
Auctions where bidders can bid on additional parameters (quality, delivery time, etc..) are 
used by around 48% of the companies. However, contrary to what is promoted in the 
academic literature, most of these auctions are not used for quality parameters but for 
different price parameters. A simpler alternative to Multiattribute Auctions are Rank 
Auctions with a Bonus Malus rule. Bidders with inferior quality, higher transport costs or 
additional switching costs receive a Malus which decreases their bid automatically to 
incorporate the disadvantages. Bonus Malus Auctions are used by about 50% of all 
companies. Summarizing we state that the sixth hypothesis should be revised. Although 
Multiattribute Auctions are used rather frequently, they are not especially used for more 
complex items. Instead, they are applied to find suppliers for contracts where different 
price parameters are relevant. 
Additionally to these findings and other results on more specific design aspects such as 
starting prices and ending rules (see Eichstädt 2007) the survey showed that barriers to 
implementation are a very important issue. According to the experts interviewed, the 
limited acceptance of buyers to use auctions for their purchases is the biggest problem 
during the implementation of auctions. Reasons for the limited acceptance are: the fear of 
buyers to abandon their “core competency” negotiation; the fear of having less decision 
power and less contact with suppliers; the low levels of buyers qualification and their 
narrow view of their responsibilities; the limited willingness of buyers to use modern IT-
based tools and the fear of having to work more. 
Some of the interviewees reported that the opposition of suppliers to auctions is a further 
important implementation issue. Suppliers’ opposition is mainly due to fears of unfair 
behavior of buyers. Unfair behavior of buyers includes auctions to screen the market with 
no intention of awarding a contract and the submission of fake bids.  
 
Conclusions and Managerial Implications 
1. The general use of reverse auctions 
The results show that auctions are becoming a relevant tool for B2B procurement, 
especially in large corporations. When reverse auctions are used, they replace the 
distributive part of traditional price negotiations. According to the interviewees, internal 
resistance from buyers to the use of auctions is the major barrier for the use of online 
reverse auctions. Thus, measures to support the implementation of online reverse auction 
must accompany any internal implementation processes. Furthermore, suppliers are likely 
to be reluctant to use auctions. To overcome their skepticism, it is important to ensure 
that auctions are conducted on a fair and honest basis. An unresolved question is whether 
reverse auctions are a suitable tool for small companies or not. The fact that smaller 
companies use auctions only to a very limited extend might be explained by problems of 
small companies to ensure supplier participation in reverse auctions. Large companies, 
instead, have significantly more purchasing and market power to force suppliers to 
participate in reverse auctions. 
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2. The use of different variations of the English Auction 
The following paragraph develops a concept for the systematic use of different variations 
of the English Auction. It is based on the assumption, that bidders in online reverse 
auctions have bidding costs, due to the time they spend bidding and due to the disclosure 
of sensitive information about their willingness to accept prices. Therefore we assume 
bidders quit auctions immediately if the prospects for winning the auction are very small. 
The decision to quit an auction is based upon bidders’ valuations (costs), the number of 
bidders, and the distance to the leading bid. Whenever bidders get the impression that 
they have no chance to win the auction, they quit. The immediate quitting of bidders 
deteriorates auction results, because it reduces the number of active bidders3. Based on 
these assumptions, it is essential to frame auctions in a way that keeps bidders from 
quitting early. Therefore in a situation with many bidders and large spreads among the 
initial offers of bidders Best/ Not Best Auction should be applied to avoid daunting 
effects of a high number of bidders or large spreads to the best bid. When the spread of 
initial offers is large, but the overall number of bidders is low, a Pure Rank Auction 
without information about the best price should be used to avoid daunting effects of large 
spreads to the best bid. The overall lower ranks for all bidders, instead, encourage bidders 
to continue bidding. When both, the number of bidders and the spread of the initial offers 
are low English Rank Auction should be preferred since the information about a low 
rank and a close best price will encourage bidders to continue bidding. In the remaining 
case of a high number of bidders and low spreads between initial offers a Best Price 
Auction should be used to avoid daunting effects of a high number of bidders and low 
ranks. The small spread to the best bid, instead, encourages bidders to continue bidding. 
The following picture 1 presents the basic concept for variations of the English Auction. 
Picture 1:       Number of Bidders  
           High    Low  
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 Low               
 
3. The use of different auction forms 
The following paragraph develops a concept for the systematic use of different auction 
                                              
3 It is a well known result from auction theory, that revenues improve with a raising number of bidders (Vickery 1961). 
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forms in a way closely related to the previous paragraph. In addition to the previous 
paragraph the concept is based on the assumption that a bigger spread between initial 
offers is an indicator for bigger asymmetries between bidders. Additionally we assume 
that with a rising number of bidders, the revenue/price effects of affiliation between 
valuations (costs) become stronger. Finally we expect bidders to be risk-averse, thus 
bidding slightly higher in Firstprice or Dutch Auctions, especially when they don’t know 
how many bidders are participating. In this setting we expect Hybrid Auctions to 
provide the best results in situations with many bidders and a large spread between the 
initial offers. This is because a Hybrid Auction allows bidders to adapt to competitors 
bids in the first (English) round and is more effective to get beyond the 2nd best price in 
the second (Firstprice) auction round. Whenever there is only a small number of bidders 
with large spreads between initial offers we expect Dutch or Firstprice Auctions to be 
superior. This is because they are more effective to get beyond the 2nd best price in the 
case of asymmetries and they create additional insecurity because bidders must not know 
how many bidders are participating. The loss of benefits from possible affiliation among 
bidders' valuations is accepted since it is expected to be small with only a few bidders. In 
the case of small spreads between initial offers we refer to the recommendations in the 
previous chapter. Combined with a high number of bidders Best Price Auctions should be 
used, in the case of a small number of bidders English Rank Auctions should be applied 
as shown in picture 2 below 
Picture 2:               Number of Bidders  
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We find the application of Hybrid Auctions especially appealing since they combine 
important benefits of the English Auction (because of affiliated valuations) with the 
benefits of Firstprice Auctions (because of asymmetries and risk aversion). Interestingly 
auction theorists have not highlighted these advantages of Hybrid Auctions so far. The 
only exemption is Klemperer who recommends the use of Hybrid Auctions to make 
auctions more attractive for weaker bidders (Klemperer 2001).  
 
4. The use of complex auction forms 
The results show, that Combinatorial Auctions are only used by a limited amount of 
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companies (15%) so far. However, those companies using Combinatorial Auctions are 
convinced that they provide a superior solution to handle complex negotiation settings. 
The positive results of combinatorial auctions reported by interviewees, as well as the 
results of other empirical studies on procurement auctions4, indicate that Combinatorial 
Auctions will become an increasingly important tool for B2B procurement.  
Multiattribute Auctions are much more commonly used in purchasing. 48% of the 
companies already use Multiattribute Auctions. Contrary to the underlying theoretical 
concepts, however, these auctions are not used for quality parameters in practice but for 
different price parameters. So far the empirical analysis of Multiattribute Auctions has 
been based on laboratory experiments5 comparing Multiattribute Auctions with standard 
auctions. The advantages of Multiattribute Auctions over traditional negotiations, 
however, still have to be proven in practice. Such a proof might help to convince auction 
users in the corporate world to employ Multiattribute Auctions instead of traditional 
supplier negotiations more often.  
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